Where possible vessels should also maintain 50nm from the coast of any populated landmass. Maintain a strict communications watch and establish communication with all vessels coming close. Vessels should consider their proximity to Saudi flagged vessels when transiting the BaM / Red Sea particularly when off the coast of Yemen and in proximity to Hannish Islands. Vessels should also consider proximity when at anchor or loading within the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.

The general principle is to transit areas of higher risk by day to maximise your detection distance. Night transit significantly alter the risk profile. It should be noted that this is different to traditional maritime security risks where most suspicious approaches occur within daylight hrs. If a nigh transit is required, significant care should be taken to provide substantial illumination of vessel including surrounding area and extremities. There is no requirement for a standing patrol of deck area in transit if illumination and speed are constant.

Vessels should achieve appropriate and constant speed at the soonest opportunity upon departure and whilst within the risk area. The Master should consider increasing to full sea speed if suspicious activity develops. Small boats find great difficulty maintaining speed running into sea. Keeping a potential aggressor in a stern chase at maximum sea speed is ideal. Appropriate speed will depend on weather conditions at the time.

Given the risk profile, and the specific Geo-political nature of the risk in the area of concern, the intended transit is able to be conducted in the absence of an embarked armed security team. The addition of unarmed observers is not recommended. Full compliance with BMP5 is considered essential in areas of risk. In addition, significant outward and area lighting would serve as a suitable deterrent to both vessels at anchorage and underway. Transits should be conducted with full BMP5 measures in place if necessary, in the Master?s judgement or in accordance with Company statutory policy.

Vessels are advised to keep the Automatic Information System (AIS) on and are reminded that there is no requirement to complete the field stating the last or next port of call. Vessels are reminded that the ?spoofing?of GPSdata is possible and as such manual verification of positioning is essential when in the Strait of Hormuz. In addition and whilst at anchor, vessels should consider implementing the following measures if deemed appropriate by the CSO / Vessel Master: - Rotate the propeller continuously or at short, irregular intervals. - Operate bow and stern thrusters at zero (0) thrust. - Turn the rudder frequently. - Switch the echo sounder to transmit counter/combat swimmer/diver threat. - In all cases, take care to register with MSCHOA and report to UKMTO. Emergency evacuation procedures should continue to be well rehearsed and understood by all crew. Vessel masters and company CSO?s should consider protocol in respect of interaction with state forces i.e. USNavy and IRGC(N). In all cases vessels should comply and remain vigilant.

A step aside manoeuvre is a diagnostic action designed to test the intent of a newly detected vessel to determine its intentions. On spotting a suspicious vessel with a CPA less than 2nm alter course immediately to determine if the vessel alters to maintain a closing CPA. At a point where this is feels suspicious the Master should consider increasing to maximum sea speed and sounding the alarm and reacting in accordance with piracy drills. Identification Criteria (IDCRIT) to assess a vessel as suspicious are one of the following: - Any contact, Dhow sized or smaller who alters course to maintain a close CPA. - The OOW is suspicious. Released in accordance with terms of use available here: https://dryadglobal.com/terms-of-use/#disclaimer